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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE
WORLDWIDE COMBINED REPORTING
METHOD OF TAXATION OF
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS:
BARCLAYS BANK V FRANCHISE TAX BOARD
INTRODUCTION
The imposition of taxes by the states has raised constitutional
concerns for as long as the United States Constitution has been in
effect.' With the increasingly global economy, however, complex tax
issues have arisen that the Framers could not have contemplated.' As
such, in recent years both Congress and the Supreme Court have
struggled to delineate the restrictions of the United States Constitution
on internationally imposed state taxes. 3
One especially controversial area of state taxation has been Cali-
fornia's unitary method of taxation of international corporations."
Since its adoption in the early 1970's, international corporations and
foreign countries have attacked the unitary method as unconstitu-
tional. 5 Protesters have argued that the unitary tax violates both the
Commerce and the Due Process Clauses of the United States Consti-
tution because it is likely to have the effect of taxing income earned
I See, e.g., Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656 (1975) (holding state tax having effect of
taxing only income of non-resident taxpayers invalid under Article IV, § 2 of the Constitution);
Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37 (1920) (concluding state tax assessed on income accruing to
non-residents from property or business within state comported with due process requirements
of Constitution); Case of the State Freight Tax, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 232 (1872) (invalidating state
tax as violating unexercised power of Congress to regulate commerce).
2 See, e.g., Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal., 114 S. Ct. 2268 (1994) (constitu-
tionality of California method of taxing in-state earnings of foreign multinational corporation);
Wardair Canada, Inc. v. Florida Dept. of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1 (1986) (constitutionality of Florida
method of taxing in-state airline fuel purchases by foreign airlines); ASARCO v. Idaho State Tax
Comm'n, 458 U.S. 307 (1982) (constitutionality of inclusion in Idaho tax imposed on in-state
parent corporation of intangible income earned by out-of-state subsidiary).
3 See, e.g., Barclays, 114 S. Ct. at 2268; Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S.
159 (1983); Japan Line Ltd. v, County of L.A., 441 U.S. 434 (1979).
4 See, e.g., Barclays, 114 S. Ct. at 2268; Container, 463 U.S. at 159 (both contesting constitu-
tional validity of California's unitary tax).
5 See Barclays Bank Int'l Ltd. v, Franchise Tax Board, 275 Cal. Rptr. 626, 638 (Ct. App. 1990)
("Every single nation in the industrialived western world has sent letters to the United States
government protesting the use of WWCR by American states.")
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outside the state, and as such, affect both interstate and international
commerce. 6
Such litigation has forced the United States Supreme Court to give
a modern interpretation to the words of the Constitution and their
applicability to the complex economy of today.' In 1994, in Barclays
Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Board, the Court rendered a decision that
has the practical effect of relaxing the constitutional restrictions on
internationally imposed state taxes. 8 In that decision, the Court held
that the unitary method of taxation was constitutionally valid as applied
to a foreign-parent, multinational corporation. 9
This Note discusses the unitary method, its effect on internation-
ally earned income of multinational corporations, and the develop-
ment of the Court's analysis of its constitutional validity. Part I defines
the various methods of allocating income for taxation purposes.m Part
II describes in more detail California's unitary tax provisions." Part III
provides an overview of the constitutional requirements of all state
taxes, and more specifically, the various constitutional issues raised by
the unitary tax.' 2 Part IV discusses the 1983 United States Supreme
Court decision upholding the unitary tax as applied to a domestic
multinational corporation, Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Board)
Part V focuses on the 1986 United States Supreme Court decision
Wardair Canada, Inc. v. Florida Department of Revenue, and its limiting
effect on the restrictions of the Foreign Commerce Clause." Part VI
sets forth a detailed discussion of the Barclays decision.'' Finally, Part
VII argues that the Barclays Court did not apply the correct analysis
in determining that the unitary method is constitutional as applied
to foreign corporations and concludes that the unitary tax, as applied
to foreign-parent multinational corporations, violates the Commerce
Clause of the United States Constitution.' 6
I. METHODS OF ALLOCATING INCOME FOR TAXATION
When a corporation conducts business in more than one state,
the proper allocation of income for tax purposes becomes an issue
6 See Barclays, 114 S. Ct. at 2272; Container, 463 U.S. at 162.
7 See Barclays, 119 S. Ct. at 2268; Container, 463 U.S. at 159.
8 114 S. Gt. at 2268.
9 Id. at 2270.
10 See infra notes 17-53 and accompanying text.
II See infra notes 54-67 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 68-133 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 134-235 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 236-66 and accompanying text.
16 See infra notes 267-342 and accompanying text.
16 See infra notes 343-85 and accompanying text.
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because both the Commerce and the Due Process Clauses of the
United States Constitution prohibit states from taxing value earned
outside their borders.' 7
 The constitutional restrictions are even stricter
when a state taxes the income of a multinational corporation because
such a tax must also meet the requirements of the Foreign Commerce
Clause. 18
 As a result, a state that imposes a tax on a multistate or
multinational corporation must determine a method of fairly allocat-
ing the corporation's taxable income earned within the state.' 9
 Where
the taxpayer corporation is part of an integrated enterprise that does
business in more than one state, it is difficult, if not impossible, to
precisely apportion the corporation's income among the several juris-
dictions in which it does business. 2" As a result, a jurisdiction must use
an acceptable method of reasonably allocating the corporation's ap-
proximate income earned inside the jurisdiction. 21
 There are two gen-
erally accepted methods of apportionment in the United States—the
separate accounting method and formulary apportionment. 22
A. Separate Accounting
The separate accounting method of apportionment, also known
as the arm's length method, is based on geographical or transac-
tional accounting.° Under this method, each subsidiary of a corpora-
tion is treated as an independent entity that deals at arm's length with
affiliated corporations." A jurisdiction using the separate accounting
method taxes only the profits of each affiliated corporation that the
corporation recognizes in its internal accounting records as earned
within that taxing jurisdiction. 25
 Consequently, a corporation using the
separate accounting method must maintain accounting records that
enable it to determine with some degree of accuracy the net income
earned in each of the jurisdictions in which it operates. 26
Historically, the separate accounting method was the preferred
method of allocating the income of multistate corporations among the
states, but it generally has been abandoned both by taxpayers and the
17 U.S. Coists .r. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; id. amend. XIV; see also ASARCO, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax
Comm'n., 458 U.S. 307, 315 (1982).
18
 Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of L.A., 441 U.S. 434, 446 (1979).
19
 Container Corp. of Ant. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 169 (1983).
29 M. at 164.
21 Id. at 169.
22potostp: B.. HELLERSTEIN & WALTER HELLERSTEIN, STATE & LOCAL TAXATION 417-18 (5th
ed. 1988).
23 Id. at 417.
24
 Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal., 114 S. CL 2268, 2273 (1994).
25 Id.
26
 HELLERSTEIN &	 supra note 22, at 446.
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states.27 Taxpaying corporations have found the separate accounting
method expensive and unworkable in practice because it requires a
corporation to establish fair arm's length prices for all goods trans-
ferred or services rendered between affiliated corporations." The
states have rejected the method because it assumes (unrealistically, they
contend) that the income of integrated business operations can be
separated and allocated among the various affiliated businesses. 29 Use
of the separate accounting method also poses the risk that a conglom-
erate will shift income among its subsidiaries in order to minimize its
total tax burden." To avoid such manipulation, the taxing sovereign
must scrutinize all transactions between related corporations to ensure
that they are reported at a price reflecting their true value. 3 ' This
method is further complicated by the fact that it is sometimes impos-
sible to establish accurate arm's length prices for goods transferred or
services rendered between affiliated corporations.52
Although the states have rejected the separate accounting method
of apportionment, the United States Federal Government and the
international community favor this method for allocating income of
multinational corporations for taxation purposes. 33
13. Formulary Apportionment and the Unitary Method
The method of apportionment by formula assumes that affiliated
corporations are interdependent and that the income of any one
corporation is a product of the integrated functions of all affiliated
corporations. 34 Consequently, the theory behind formulary apportion-
ment is that it is realistically impossible to accurately allocate income
produced by affiliated corporations among the various affiliates on a
geographical or transactional basis." The United States Supreme Court
approved formulary apportionment as a constitutional method of al-
locating income in 1920." Due to the aforementioned difficulties in
applying the separate accounting method, all of the states use some
27
 Id. at 446-47.
28 Id.
29 Id. at 467.
w Barclays, 114 S. Ct. at 2273.
31 Irl.
32 HELLERSTE1N & ELLERSTEIN, supra note 22, at 467.
33 Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 187 (1983).
See. HELLERSTEI & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 22, at 467.
3n See id.
w Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U.S. 113, 120-21 (1920).
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type of formulary apportionment to determine the in-state taxable
income of multistate corporations."
One type of formulary apportionment method, known as the
"unitary tax," treats affiliated companies as a unitary business and
applies a formula to determine the portion of a corporation's total
income that is allocable to a particular state." To determine the proper
amount of taxable income within a state, the state defines the scope of
the corporation's unitary business and then apportions the total in-
come of that unitary business between the taxing jurisdiction and other
jurisdictions on the basis of a formula. 39 The most common formula
used to calculate the local tax base involves three factors that deter-
mine the percentage of total payroll, property and sales located within
the state.° The state averages these percentage figures and then uses
the averaged percentage to tax the total income of a corporation.'"
The principle drawback to the unitary tax results from the fact
that wages and costs of resources may not be uniform among the
several jurisdictions in which a corporation operates. 42
 Corporations
are likely to earn more profits in jurisdictions with low wages and costs
of production. 4" Thus, when a jurisdiction with high wages and costs
imposes a flat percentage tax on a corporation's total income, that tax
will likely cover profits actually earned by affiliated corporations in
other jurisdictions."
A state may impose a unitary tax only on a corporation whose op-
erations constitute a unitary business. 43 No universal definition of "uni-
tary business" exists; instead, the definition varies among the states."
At a minimum, however, the definition requires some common bond
of ownership or control between the affiliated entities and a concrete
relationship between the in-state and out-of-state activities of the uni-
tary business. 47 The United States Supreme Court has approved a
37 HELLERSTEIN	 HELLERSTEIN, supra note 22, at 473, 506. See supra notes 27-32 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the difficulties in applying the separate accounting method.
"Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 165 (1983).
39 Id.
40 See Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal., 114 S. Ct. 2268, '1273 (1994).
41 See id. For example, if a corporation has three percent. of its property, eight percent. of its
payroll, and four percent of its sales within the state, its allocation percentage will he five. Id. The
state will then tax the corporation on five percent of its total income. Id.
42 See Container, 463 U.S. at 199 (Powell, J., dissenting).
43 See id. (Powell, J., dissenting).
44 See id. (Powell, J., dissenting). See infra notes 213-16 and accompanying text for discussion
of this problem.
45 See HELLERSTEIN HELLERSTEIN, supra note 22, at 512.
46 See Container, 463 U.S. at 178-79.
47
 Container, 463 U.S. at 166.
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three-prong test for determining whether related entities comprise a
unitary business. 46 Under the Court's test, a unitary business exists
among affiliated entities with: (1) unity of ownership; (2) unity of use;
and (3) unity of operation. 49 Unity of ownership generally exists when
one taxpayer owns at least fifty percent of the voting stock of the
corporations." Unity of use is present where the corporations share
common executive control and general operational systems. 5 ' Unity of
operation is found where the affiliated entities use the same purchas-
ing, accounting, advertising or management divisions. 52 The Court,
however, does not consider this to he the only test for determining
whether a unitary business exists and instead generally defers to state
court definitions of unitary business, so long as they are "within the
realm of possible judgment. "53
II. CALIFORNIA'S UNITARY TAX PROVISIONS
A. Worldwide Combined Reporting
California uses the worldwide combined reporting method of
apportionment ("WWCR"), a variant of the unitary business method,
to determine the portion of income of a multijurisdictional enterprise
that is attributable to California." Under WWCR, all affiliated corpo-
rations of an enterprise are treated as a unitary group regardless of the
location of the affiliates." If a corporation doing business in California
is a member of a unitary group, then the total income for that group
will be apportioned to California for the purposes of applying the
aforementioned three-factor formula. 56 The total income for this uni-
tary group will thus include the income of affiliated corporations
48 Butler Bros. v. McGuigan, Ill P.2d 334, 341 (Cal. 1941), affd, 315 U.S. 501, 508 (1942).
49 Id.
5') See Elizabeth Harris, Desperate for Revenue: The States' Unconstitutional Use of the Unitary




53 Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 176 (1983). The Court has
only rejected a state court's finding of a unitary business twice. See ASARCO, Inc. v. Idaho Tax
Gointit'n., 458 U.S. 307, 330 (1982); F.W. Woolworth, Co. v. Taxation & Revenue Dept., 458 U.S.
354, 372-73 (1982).
54 CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE, § 25101 (West 1992); Barclays Bank Int'l Ltd. v. Franchise Tax
Bd., 275 Cal. Rpm 626, 627 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
55 Barclays, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 627.
88 Id.
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operating entirely outside of California or even outside of the United
States.57
Both domestic and foreign multinational corporations oppose
WWCR as imposing double taxation on profits earned through foreign
operations. 58
 Foreign countries have also opposed WWCR as imposing
a tax on profits that they alone are entitled to tax. 59 Some countries,
such as Great Britain, have approved legislation permitting retaliatory
measures against U.S. companies operating both in their country and
in states using WWCR, and have threatened to implement such legis-
lation if those states fail to enact a satisfactory solution to the problems
created by WWCR. 69
B. Water's-edge Election
In 1986, California modified its state corporate franchise income
tax provisions to include a water's-edge election for multinational
corporate taxpayers. 6 ' Under the water's-edge alternative to WWCR, a
corporation may limit its combined reporting group to affiliates in the
unitary business whose individual presence in the United States sur-
passes a certain threshold. 62
 In practice, application of the water's-edge
election works as a separate accounting method with the United States
as the jurisdictional boundary. 63
The original version of the water's-edge election conditioned a
corporation's election on payment of a substantial fee and allowed the
California Franchise Tax Board (the "Board") to disregard a water's-
edge election under certain circumstances." Foreign governments
were not satisfied with this version of the water's-edge election as a
solution to the burden created by WWCR, however, and in 1993, the
United Kingdom threatened retaliatory measures against U.S. interests
operating in its jurisdiction if WWCR states did not alleviate such
burden by the year's end.65
 As a result, in 1993 California modified the
water's-edge election to remove the fee requirement and the threat of
57 Id.
"See Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. 114 S. Ct. 2268, 2289-90 (1994)
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
"Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of L.A., 441 U.S. 434, 451-52 (1979).
66 See Barclays Bank Intl Ltd. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 275 Cal. Rptr. 626, 638 (Cal. Ct. App.
1990).
CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §§ 25110-25115 (West 1992).
"Id.
63 Barclays, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 628 n.2.
44 CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 25110 (West 1992).
"Mattis L. Carson, Barclays, Colgate & WWCR Get Their Day in Court, Tax NOTES, Apr. 4,
1994, at 7-8.
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disregard by the Board. 66 Foreign governments, however, remain dis-
satisfied with the prospective nature of the provision because it offers
them no relief for excessive taxes paid in the past and have continued
to seek a ruling that the WWCR method is unconstitutiona1. 67
III, CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES RAISED BY THE UNITARY TAX
A. Requirements of the Due Process Clause
1. Fair Apportionment
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
requires that in order to comport with substantive due process, the
amount of income taxed by a state must be fairly related to the tax-
payer's activities within that state.'s The United States Supreme Court
has stated that for an apportionment formula to be fair, it must be both
internally and externally consistent. 69 An apportionment formula is
internally consistent, if, when applied by every jurisdiction, it would
result in no more than all of the unitary business's income being
taxed." An apportionment formula is externally consistent if it reflects
a reasonable sense of how income is generated among the several
jurisdictions. 7 ' Although the Court has set forth these guidelines as due
process requirements of apportionment formulas, it still has given
fairly wide discretion to the states in allocating income for taxation
purposes. 72
2. Reasonableness of Administrative Compliance
Corporations have attacked the constitutionality of VVVVCR by
claiming that the additional compliance burden it places on corpora-
56 CA I,. Ray. & Tax. CODE § 25110 (West 1995).
Carson, supra note 65, at 8. For example, in Barclays, Barclays Bank was seeking a refund
of taxes assessed in 1977. 114 S. Ct, at 2272.
69 Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 169 (1983); Hans Rees' Sons,
Inc. v. North Carolina ex rel. Maxwell, 283 U.S. 123, 129, 134 (1931).
69 Container, 463 U.S. at 169.
79 Id.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 169-70. For example, in Container, the Court held that a unitary tax that resulted
in a 14% increase in the corporation's taxable income attributable to California met Due Process
requirements. Id. at 184. The Court reasoned that the tax was fair because the percentage increase
was "within the substantial margin of error inherent in any method of attributing income among
the components of a unitary business." Id.; cf. Hans Rees' Sons, 283 U.S. at 135-36 (apportionment
formula resulting in 250% increase in state tax found to violate Due Process requirements).
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dons violates procedural due process." Specifically, corporations have
claimed that: (1) the administration costs of compliance with the
requirements of WWCR are unreasonable, undue and arbitrary; and
(2) the WWCR compliance process lacks reasonable standards to guide
enforcement." The United States Supreme Court, however, has not
accepted these arguments." First, the Court has determined that the
compliance burdens can be alleviated by relief provisions contained in
the California regulations themselves." Second, the Court has deter-
mined that the WWCR compliance process is guided by the standard
of reasonableness, a standard long used in taxing systems."
B. Commerce Clause Scrutiny: The Test of Complete Auto
Transit, Inc. v. Brady
In 1977, in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, the United States
Supreme Court held that a Mississippi tax on the privilege of conduct-
ing business within the state did not violate the Commerce Clause
when applied to an interstate activity." The Mississippi State Tax Com-
mission imposed a "privilege of doing business" tax on Complete Auto
Transit, Inc. ("Complete Auto"), a Michigan corporation engaged in
the business of transporting motor vehicles for the General Motors
Corporation," Complete Auto's business activities within Mississippi
consisted of transporting vehicles from a railhead in Jackson, Missis-
sippi, to Mississippi General Motors dealers. 8° The Mississippi Tax Com-
mission assessed taxes in excess of $165,000 against Complete Auto for
sales of transportation services during the period from August 1, 1968,
through July 31, 1972.81
 Complete Auto paid the assessments under
protest and filed a refund suit in the Chancery Court of the First
Judicial District of Hinds County, arguing that its operations were one
part of a continuous interstate movement and that the taxes thus
assessed were unconstitutional as applied to instrumentalities of inter-
state commerce. 82
 The Chancery Court upheld the assessments in an
73
 Barclays Bank Intl Ltd. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 537, 545 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
74 Id.
75 See Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal,, 114 S. Ct. 2268, 2278-79 (1994).
76 1d. at 2278.
77 Id. See infra note 297 and accompanying text for examples of this standard.
73 430 U.S. 274, 289 (1977).
70 Id. at 275-76. The tax was imposed pursuant to Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 10105, 10109(2),
10117, as amended.
80 Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 276.
81 Id. at 276-77.
82 Id. at 277.
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unreported opinion. 83 The Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the
decision of the Chancery Court, concluding that the extensive opera-
tions of Complete Auto within Mississippi demanded the same services
from the state as other taxpaying citizens. 84 The court further deter-
mined that the tax did not discriminate against interstate commerce
and did not pose a risk of duplication in another state." The United
States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction to determine the
constitutional issues raised by the tax and affirmed the findings of the
Mississippi courts."
In sustaining the Mississippi tax, the Court employed a dormant
Commerce Clause analysis for determining the constitutional validity
of a tax imposed on interstate commerce. 87 Under the Complete Auto
test, a state tax imposed on an instrumentality of interstate commerce
will survive Commerce Clause scrutiny if: (I) the business activities
have a substantial nexus with the taxing state; (2) the tax is fairly
apportioned; (3) the tax does not discriminate against interstate com-
merce; and (4) the tax is fairly related to the services provided by
the state.88 Subsequent courts that have applied the Complete Auto test
to interstate and international taxes have further interpreted and clari-
fied the guidelines of this four-prong test. 89
First, a substantial nexus will be found when there is a minimal
connection between the business activities of the corporation and the
taxing state and clearly exists when a corporation actually conducts
business within the state.'" Second, a tax is fairly apportioned if the
income attributed to the state bears a rational relationship to the value
of the business activities conducted by the corporation within the
state. 91 Courts will find apportionment formulas unfair as applied only
where the resulting income allocation is completely out of proportion
to the in-state activities of the corporate taxpayer. 92 A tax may violate
the nondiscrimination requirement of the Commerce Clause if it is so
different from methods applied by other jurisdictions that it would
83 id.
84 Id.
85 Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 277.
86 Id. at 275, 289.
87 See id. at 279.
88 Id.
89 See, e.g., Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal., 114 S. Ct. 2268 (1994); Container
Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159 (1983); ASARCO, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n,
458 U.S. 307 (1982).
9° See Barclays, 114 S. Ct. at '2276.
91 Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 180-81.
92 Id.
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necessarily result in multiple taxation in different jurisdictions." Addi-
tionally, an apportionment formula may discriminate against interstate
commerce if it results in a higher tax burden than the taxpayer would
incur if its operations were conducted in only one jurisdiction." In
practice, the nondiscrimination requirement in the interstate context
has not required much more than fair apportionment, but the Su-
preme Court has noted that a more searching inquiry is required in
the international context.95
 Finally, a tax will be considered fairly re-
lated to the services provided by the state if the amount of the tax bears
a reasonable fiscal relation to the protection, opportunities and bene-
fits provided by the state.96
C. Foreign Commerce Clause Implications: The Requirements of
Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles
In 1979, in Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, the United
States Supreme Court held that California's imposition of an ad valo-
rem property tax on Japan Line, Ltd.'s ('Japan Line") shipping con-
tainers violated the Foreign Commerce Clause because it resulted in
multiple taxation of instrumentalities of foreign commerce.° Japan
Line consisted of six Japanese shipping companies incorporated and
domiciled in Japan." The ships were specifically designed to accom-
modate large shipping containers and were used exclusively for hire
in the international transportation of cargo.99
 Both the ships and the
containers had their home ports in Japan and were subject to property
tax there.m Japan Line's containers passed through California peri-
odically during the course of their international journeys, generally
remaining in the state less than three weeks.m
California imposed an ad valorem property tax on any property
present in California on March 1, the "lien date" set under California
law.'°2
 In the years 1970, 1971 and 1972, Japan Line had a number of
containers present in California on the lien date, and California im-
93 See id. at 170-71.
94 Id,
9 '1 Id.
96 ASARCO, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 458 U.S. 307, 315 (1982).
97 441 U.S. 434, 456-57 (1979).
" Id. at 436.
99 Id.
ton Id .
at 436-37. The ships remained in California ports only for the time necessary to pick
up cargo or return containers. See Japan Line Ltd. v. County of L.A., 571 P.2d 254, 256 (Cal.
1977).
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 CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §§ 117, 405, 2192 (West 1989).
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posed property taxes in excess of $550,000 for the three years.'° 3 Dur-
ing that time, Japan refrained from imposing property taxes on similar
containers of United States shipping companies present in Japan dur-
ing the course of international commerce, in accordance with the
Customs Convention on Containers, signed by both the United States
and Japan. 1 °4 Japan Line paid the taxes under protest and sued for a
refund in the Superior Court for the County of Los Angeles. 105
The California Superior Court held the assessment of taxes un-
constitutional as a violation of the "home port doctrine."'°°The home
port doctrine, an effort to avoid multiple taxation of international
commerce, states that instrumentalities of foreign commerce can be
taxed only in their home ports.'° 7 The court further stated that appor-
tionment of taxes is not practical when one of the taxing entities is a
foreign sovereign because of the absence of an effective tribunal that
can adjudicate the competing rights of the sovereigns to the taxes.'° 8
The California Court of Appeal reversed and concluded that the
Supreme Court of California previously had rejected the home port
doctrine and upheld apportioned property taxation.m° The court re-
jected the argument that Japan Line warranted a different result be-
cause the containers in Japan Line were foreign-owned and used ex-
clusively in international commerce."° The court further rejected the
risk of multiple taxation as a limit on the state's power to levy the
property tax.'" The Supreme Court of California similarly sustained
the validity of the tax. 112 The court deemed the container's foreign
ownership and use irrelevant to the constitutional analysis and rejected
Japan Line's Commerce Clause challenge to the tax."' Japan Line
1 °3Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 437.
It" See id. at 452-53. This Convention grants containers "temporary admission free of import
duties and import taxes and free of import prohibitions or restrictions" so long as they are used
exclusively in foreign commerce and are subject to re-exportation. Customs Convention on
Containers, May 18, 1956, Art. 2, 20 U.S.T. 301, 304, 338 U.N.T.S. 103.
1 °5 Japan Line, 441 U.S at 437.
lw Id at 437-38.
107 Id. at 438.
1418 Id, The Court further states that the International Court is not a satisfactory tribunal
because all parties must consent to its jurisdiction. Id.
14)9Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 438; see also Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. County of Alameda, 528 P.2d
56 (Cal. 1974) (rejecting home port doctrine as "anachronistic" and upheld apportioned property
taxation of containers owned by domestic corporation used both in intercoastal and foreign
commerce).
IlVapan Line, 441 U.S. at 438. In contrast, the taxpayer in Sea-Land was a domestic corpo-
ration involved in both intercoastal and foreign commerce. See 528 P.2d at 58.
111
,Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 438-39.
112 /d. at 439.
13 1d. at 439.
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appealed the decision to the United States Supreme Court, which
granted appellate jurisdiction in order to decide the constitutionality
of the property tax.I14
In reversing the lower court's opinion and holding California's ad
valorem property tax unconstitutional, the United States Supreme
Court concluded that where the taxpayer corporation is a foreign
entity, a taxing method must meet additional requirements to those
set forth in Complete Auto in order to pass Foreign Commerce Clause
scrutiny."' First, the tax must not create a substantial risk of interna-
tional multiple taxation." 6 Second, the tax must satisfy the "One Voice"
doctrine, which states that such a tax must not impair federal uniform-
ity in an area where federal uniformity is essential."" Because the Court
found that California's ad valorem tax created actual, not merely the
risk of, multiple international taxation and prevented federal uniform-
ity in regulating foreign commerce, the Court held the tax unconsti-
tutional. 18
1. Enhanced Risk of Multiple Taxation
In discussing the enhanced risk of multiple taxation, the Court
restated the concern voiced by the California Superior Court that
proper apportionment cannot be ensured where one of the taxing
entities is a foreign sovereign." 9 The Court emphasized that taxation
of a foreign corporation is unlike taxation of a multistate domestic
corporation, where the Court can require all taxing jurisdictions to
apportion taxes to ensure that the taxpayer corporation is not subject
to more than one tax on its full value.' 26 Rather, due to the lack of an
international tribunal capable of ensuring that the aggregation of taxes
on an international corporation do not equal more than one full value,
even a fairly apportioned state tax will likely subject foreign commerce
to constitutionally forbidden multiple taxation.' 2 '
" 4 1d. at 440.
115 /d. at 446, 457. The Commerce Clause expressly gives Congress the power to 'regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States." U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. In
addition, the Commerce Clause has long been interpreted to prohibit discrimination from
interstate or foreign commerce even where Congress has not acted. Southern Pac, Co. v. Arizona
ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 768 (1945); South Carolina State Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros.,
Inc., 303 U.S. 177, 185-86 (1938).
" 6, japan Line, 441 U.S. at 448, 451.
" 7 Id. at 448-49.
"8 rd. at 451.
" 9 Id. at 447.
120 Id. at 447-48.
' 2 t Japan Line, 441 U.S. 447-48.
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The Court reasoned that California's ad valorem tax violated this
requirement because the tax resulted in multiple taxation of instru-
mentalities of foreign commerce.' 22 The Court further reasoned that
because the containers were owned, based and registered in Japan,
used exclusively in international commerce and remained outside of
Japan only for the duration of their international missions, Japan had
the right and power to tax the containers in full. 123 The Court thus
concluded that California's ad valorem property tax not only produced
the risk of multiple taxation, but also produced multiple taxation in
fact. 124
2. The Need for Federal Uniformity: The "One Voice" Doctrine
In analyzing the risk of impairment of federal uniformity, the
Court recognized that foreign commerce is primarily a matter of na-
tional concern and an area demonstrating a strong need for the
United States to speak with one voice via the federal government.' 25
The Court stressed that a state tax on instrumentalities of foreign
commerce can impair federal uniformity in several ways.' 26 First, a state
imposed apportionment tax could give rise to international disputes
over reconciling overlapping apportionment formulae. 127 Additionally,
if a state tax creates an asymmetry in the international tax structure,
foreign nations might decide to retaliate against American-owned en-
tities operating in their countries, and such retaliation would likely
harm not only the taxing state, but also the nation as a whole. 12B Finally,
if other states decided to apply their own apportioned taxes to foreign
corporations, the resulting varying degrees of multiple taxation would
clearly prevent the United States from "speaking with one voice" in
regulating foreign commerce.' 29
The Court therefore held that California's tax violated the "One
Voice" doctrine.' 5° In concluding that this was an area requiring federal
uniformity, the Court noted the Customs Convention on Containers,
signed both by the United States and Japan, as evidence of the exist-
ence of a national policy to remove impediments to the use of contain-
122 Id. at 451.
'" Id.
' 24 Id. at 452.
125 /d. at 448-49.
126 japan Line, 441 U.S. at 450-51.
127 Id. at 450.
128 Id.
129 1d. at 450-51.
150 Id. at 452.
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ers in foreign commerce.m The Court further found that California's
tax created an asymmetry in international taxation, because American-
owned containers were not taxed in Japan, and that this asymmetry
created a substantial risk of retaliation by Japan against American-
owned interests in that country.' 32
 Finally, the Court restated its posi-
tion that, if other states applied their own apportionment taxes, the
varying degrees of multiple taxation would make federal uniformity
with respect to foreign trade impossible.'"
N. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE UNITARY TAX AS APPLIED TO A
DOMESTIC MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION: CONTAINER CORP. OF
AMERICA V. FRANCHISE TAX BOARD
A. Factual Background
In 1983, in Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Board, the
Supreme Court upheld California's application of the unitary business
principle to Container Corporation of America and its foreign subsidi-
aries as proper and concluded that California's use of the three-factor
formula to apportion the income of that unitary business was fair.' 34
Container Corporation of America ("Container") was a vertically inte-
grated manufacturer of custom-ordered paperboard packaging.'" Con-
tainer was incorporated in Delaware, headquartered in Illinois and did
business in California and elsewhere.' 3"
Container primarily had domestic operations, but during the years
at issue in the case, Container had foreign operations consisting of
twenty controlled subsidiaries located in four Latin American and four
European countries, with its percentage ownership of the subsidiaries
ranging between 66.7% and 100%.'" Most of the subsidiaries were fully
integrated, but a few did not purchase their material from Container,
and sales of materials from Container to its subsidiaries accounted for
only approximately one percent of the subsidiaries' total purchases.'"
The subsidiaries had relative autonomy in the matters of personnel
and daily management; although Container had a number of its direc-
131Japan Line, 941 U.S. at 452-53.
132 Id. at 453.
' 33 1d. In so concluding, the Court noted that Oregon had already implemented such a tax.
Id.
134 463 U.S. 159, 184 (1983).
I 35 /d. at 171.
136 Id. at 163.
137 Id. at 171. The years in question were 1963, 1964 and 1965. Id.
138
 Id. at 172.
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tors and officers on the boards of directors of the subsidiaries, the
representatives generally assumed a passive role, leaving management
decisions to local executives, who were citizens of the host country.' 39
In other respects, Container and its subsidiaries enjoyed a close rela-
tionship. 14° For example, Container either held or guaranteed approxi-
mately half of the subsidiaries' long-term debt."' Container provided
technical advice and consultation to the subsidiaries. 142 Container also
assisted the subsidiaries in their acquisition of equipment, either by
selling them its used equipment or by acting as a purchasing agent for
them. 143
In 1969, after conducting an audit of Container's California Fran-
chise tax returns for the years 1963-65, the Franchise Tax Board (the
"Board") issued notices of additional assessments for each of the three
years.'" In calculating the total income of its unitary business, Con-
tainer included its own corporate net earnings, but not the income of
its subsidiaries. 145 Similarly, Container excluded the payroll, property
and sales figures of its subsidiaries in calculating its share of net income
apportionable to California under the three-factor formula. 146 The
Board issued notice to Container in 1969 that it must include its
overseas subsidiaries as part of its unitary business rather than as
passive investments.' Although the inclusion of the subsidiaries had
the effect of increasing the total income subject to apportionment and
decreasing the percentage of that income apportionable to California,
the inclusion of the subsidiaries in the unitary business resulted in an
increase in Container's tax liability in each of the three years. 145
Container paid the additional assessments under protest, and filed
suit in California Superior Court for a refund. 149 The Superior Court
upheld the assessments of the Board, and the California Court of
Appeal affirmed them. 15° The California Supreme Court refused to
exercise discretionary review, and the United States Supreme Court
noted probable jurisdiction. 15 '





144 Container, 463 U.S. at 173.
145 /d. at 174.
146 Id.
147 Id.
148 Id. at 174-75.
149 Container, 463 U.S. at 175.
150
151 Id.
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B. Supreme Court Opinion
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the findings of the
lower courts and held California's unitary tax constitutional.'" In so
holding, the Court concluded that California's application of the uni-
tary business concept to Container and its foreign subsidiaries was
proper, and that California's use of the three-factor formula to appor-
tion the income of that unitary group was fair)" The Court discussed
three specific issues in reaching its conclusion: (1) whether Container
and its subsidiaries constituted a "unitary business"; (2) whether Cali-
fornia's tax was fairly apportioned; and (3) whether the Foreign Com-
merce Clause obligated California to use the arm's length method of
allocation)."
1. Application of the Unitary Business Principle
In discussing California's determination that Container and its
subsidiaries constituted a unitary business, the Court restated the mo-
tivating factors and requirements for applying the unitary business
approach to taxation.'" First, the Court stated the requirement of some
bond of ownership and control uniting the unitary business.'" Second,
the Court noted the requirement that the out-of-state activities have a
substantial relation to the in-state activities. 157 Such relation must result
in a flow of value between the affiliates that is incapable of exact
measurement, thus rendering formulary apportionment a reasonable
method of taxation.'" The Court additionally noted that the unitary
concept is not uniform, and any number of variations on the theme
can be logically consistent with the aforementioned principles.'" The
Court further recognized that because the taxpayer bears the burden
of showing that extraterritorial values are being taxed, state court
definitions of unitary business will be overturned only when they lie
outside the realm of reasonable judgment.'"°
The Court determined that Container had not met its burden
of showing that the state's determination was without reason.m' The
152 1d, at 197.
mkt. at 184.
154 Container, 463 U.S. at 163.
155 1d. at 165-69.




159 Container, 463 U.S. at 167.
160 /d. at 175-76.
161 1d. at 177.
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Court also upheld California's application of the unitary business
method to Container and its affiliates as consistent with the underlying
principles of the unitary business concept. 162 In making the determi-
nation that a unitary business existed, the California courts found
evidence that Container both had the power to review major policy
decisions of its subsidiaries and gave them directions for compliance
with its standards of professionalism, profitability and ethical practices;
these factors demonstrated the close relationship between Container
and its subsidiaries. 163 The California courts also found that Container
gave sufficient assistance to its subsidiaries in the areas of technical
operations, personnel and financing to provide the requisite integra-
tion for a unitary group.' 64 The United States Supreme Court thus
concluded that the aggregate factors considered by the California
courts supported a reasonable finding that Container and its subsidi-
aries constituted a "unitary business."' 65
2. Apportionment Formula
In its discussion of the apportionment formula used by California,
the Court restated the requirement that the formula be fair under the
Due Process and Commerce Clauses. 166 The Court recognized that an
apportionment formula is not invalid merely because it may tax income
earned outside of the state.' 67 Rather, the Court reaffirmed that an
apportionment formula is unacceptable only where the amount of
income it allocates to the state is completely out of proportion to the
amount of business conducted in the state.' 68 The Court upheld Cali-
fornia's apportionment formula, emphasizing that the three-factor for-
mula utilized by California not only was acceptable, but also was the
formula most widely used throughout the United States.""
The Court rejected Container's argument that the formula util-
ized by California necessarily resulted in multiple taxation due to the
lower wage costs in its foreign operations."" Although the Court ac-
cepted this assertion as true, it determined that such evidence did not
impeach the reasonability of the three-factor formula."' Rather, the
162 Id. at 179-80.
163 Id. at 179.
164 Container, 463 U.S. at 179.
165 1d. at 180.
' 66 1d. at 169.
167 1d. at 169-70.
168 Id. at 170.
169 Container, 465 U.S. at 170.
1" See id. at 181-82,188.
171 Id. at 182.
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Court emphasized that both the separate accounting method and
formulary apportionment are necessarily imperfect means of allocat-
ing income that is impossible to allocate with exactness." 2 Further,
Container presented no evidence that the use of separate accounting
to allocate its income would produce less distortion than formulary
apportionment."'
3. Foreign Commerce Clause Concerns
In concluding that California's unitary tax did not violate the
Foreign Commerce Clause of the Constitution, the Court considered
the issues raised by the decision in Japan Line concerning the likeli-
hood that the tax will cause multiple taxation and whether the tax will
impair federal uniformity."' The Court, however, although noticing
the similarities between the two cases, distinguished Container from
Japan Line because Container was a domestic corporation, and Japan
Line was a foreign entity." 5 As such, the Court developed more lenient
guidelines for the Foreign Commerce Clause requirements of the
unitary tax in Container than those applied by the Court in Japan
Line."6
a. Risk of Multiple Taxation
Although the Japan Line Court suggested that even a slight over-
lapping of tax in the international context would be troublesome, the
Container Court concluded that multiple taxation alone is not enough
to strike down a tax. 177 Rather, the Court determined that two addi-
tional factors must be considered where multiple taxation exists: (1)
whether the multiple tax is the inevitable result of the apportionment
formula; and (2) whether there exist reasonable alternatives to the
allocation method used."'
The Court reasoned that although the unitary tax at issue resulted
in actual multiple taxation of Container's profits, multiple taxation was
not the inevitable result of the unitary taxing method applied.' 79 The
Court held up the situation in Japan Line as one where double taxation
172 Id.
1 " Id. at 183-84.
174 Container, 463 U.S. at 185-86.
175
 Id. at 188-89.
178 Id. at 189,193-95. See supra notes 119-33 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Japan Line Foreign Commerce Clause guidelines.
177 /d. at 189; see also japan Line Ltd. v. County of L.A., 441 U.S. 434,456 (1979).
178 See Container, 463 U.S. at 191-93.
179 Id. at 188.
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was inevitable because Japan had the right to tax the property in full,
and thus any tax imposed by California would automatically create
multiple taxation. 18° Conversely, the Court reasoned that the multiple
taxation present in Container was the result of the overlap between
California's allocation method and the methods used by other jurisdic-
tions, a combination that could, but would not necessarily, result in
multiple taxation. 18 '
The Court further concluded that California could have imple-
mented no reasonable alternative to its allocation method that would
guarantee elimination of the possibility of multiple taxation.' 82 Al-
though the separate accounting method is the accepted method in
international practice, the Court found that it would serve no rational
purpose to force California to convert to use of the separate account-
ing method because such conversion would not necessarily eliminate
the occurrence of multiple taxation.'" The Court specifically noted
that even where the separate accounting method is used, section 482
of the United States Internal Revenue Code allows the Internal Reve-
nue Service to reallocate income among businesses if it determines
that they have not fairly recognized transfers of value on their books.' 84
The Court further emphasized that many other countries have similar
provisions, but that the precise manner in which income is reallocated
differs substantially among nations.' 85 Because the use of separate ac-
counting could thus give rise to differing reallocations of income
among the countries in which Container operates, the Court elimi-
nated separate accounting as an alternative method that would prevent
multiple taxation. 188
b. Impairment of Federal Uniformity
The Container Court similarly altered the strict guidelines of the
Japan Line "One Voice" doctrine to make them more accommodat-
ing to the unitary tax.' 87 The Japan Line court found a similar tax
impermissible because it undermined federal uniformity, essential in
the area of international commerce, and thus impeded the Federal
Government's ability to speak with one voice regarding international
180 Id.
181 Id.
182 Id. at 190.
183 Container, 463 U.S. at 193.
184 Id. at 190; see also 26 U.S.C. § 482.
189 Container, 463 U.S. at 191.
186 Id.
187 Id. at 193-95. See supra notes 125-33 and accompanying text for a discussion of Japan
Line's "One Voice" doctrine.
December 1995]
	 TAXING MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS	 203
trade. 188 The Container Court, however, concluded that "foreign reso-
nances" of a state tax alone are not enough to invalidate its applica-
tion.' 8" Rather, the Container Court stated that a state tax that differs
from federal policy will violate the "One Voice" doctrine only if it either
implicates foreign policy issues that must be left to the Federal Gov-
ernment or violates a clear federal directive.'"
The Court found that California's unitary tax, as applied to Con-
tainer, did not threaten the foreign policy of the United States.'`" The
Court noted at the beginning of its discussion of this issue that the
most obvious foreign policy implication of a controversial state tax is
that it might lead to retaliation against the United States by dissatisfied
foreign trading partners.' 92
 The Court stated, however, that it is gener-
ally not the Court's province to determine federal policy or to balance
the risk of retaliation against the states' right to develop their own
taxing methods.'" The Court thus concluded that because Congress
had made no affirmative statement regarding the foreign policy impli-
cations of the tax, the Court could only develop objective standards
reflecting very general observations about the requirements of inter-
national trade and foreign relations. 194
The Court then stated three distinct factors that weighed against
a finding that the unitary tax might lead to significant foreign retali-
ation.' 95
 First, it concluded that the tax did not create an automatic
asymmetry in international taxation.'• Second, although the tax argu-
ably included foreign income, the legal burden of the tax itself fell on
a domestic corporation, thus reducing the international effects of the
tax.' 97
 Third, the Court concluded that California had a clear right to
impose some sort of tax and that the excessive burden felt by Container
was caused more by California's tax rates than by its taxing method."
In regard to this third factor, the Court noted that California could
188
 japan Line Ltd. v. County of LA., 441 U.S. 435,452-53 (1979).
189 Container, 463 U.S. at 194. The Container Court explained that the mere fact that a tax
affects foreign income is not enough to conclude that it impairs federal unifbrmity. See id. Rather,
the tax must rise to the level of implicating foreign affairs or violate an explicit congressional
directive to violate the federal uniformity doctrine. See id.
mil Id.
191 Id. at 196.
192 Id. at 194.
VA 1d.
194 Container, 4fia U.S. at 194.
195 /d, at 194-95.
199 Id. An "automatic asymmetry" would he found where a tax necessarily leads to multiple
taxation, as in Japan Line. See supra notes 122-24 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Court's finding of automatic asymmetry in that case.
197 1d. at 195.
"Id.
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have achieved the same tax result with a more orthodox taxing method
simply by raising its tax rates.'" In addition to the three central factors
that led to the Court's conclusion that the unitary tax did not violate
federal policy, the Court also noted that the failure of the Executive
Branch to file an amicus curiae brief in opposition to the unitary tax
provided additional support for its conclusion that California's ap-
plication of the unitary method did not seriously threaten foreign
policy."°
The Court likewise determined that California's application of the
unitary tax violated no clear federal direcdve. 201 In reaching this con-
clusion, the Court first reasoned that the federal tax statutes did not
preempt California's state tax law.'" The Court then stated that al-
though the United States was a party to a number of tax treaties that
require the Federal Government to use certain taxing methods, these
treaties do not bind the states.'" In this regard, the Court emphasized
that in considering a proposed treaty in the past, the Senate has at least
once declined to give its consent to a treaty provision that would have
extended its restrictions to the states.204 Finally, the Court noted that
Congress has debated, but never enacted, legislation regulating state
taxation of income. 205 Given the lack of concrete evidence to the con-
trary, the Court thus concluded that California's unitary tax violated
no clear federal directive.'"
C. Dissenting Opinion
Justice Powell filed a dissenting opinion in Container, in which
Chief Justice Burger and Justice O'Connor joiried.207 The dissent dis-
agreed with the majority's analysis of the foreign policy implications of
the tax and concluded that California's unitary tax clearly violated the
Foreign Commerce Clause.'" As a result of this ruling, the dissenting
opinion did not reach the issues of whether Container and its subsidi-
aries constituted a unitary business or whether the apportionment
formula was fair.""
199 Container, 463 U.S. at 195.
2°°/d. at 195-96.
2°L See id. at 197.
2°2 Id. at 196.
2°3 Id.
2'54 Container, 463 U.S. at 196.
2°3 Id. at 196-97.
21)6 Id. at 197.
297 Id. (Powell, J., dissenting).
2°3 Id. at 197-98 (Powell, J., dissenting).
2°9 Container, 463 U.S. at 197 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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Specifically, the dissent rejected the diluted Foreign Commerce
Clause analysis applied by the majority and argued that regardless of
any factual differences between Japan Line and Container, the princi-
ples of Japan Line should control the analysis in Container: 21 ° Under
the original Japan Line analysis, the dissent argued, a state tax is
unconstitutional if it either creates a substantial risk of multiple taxa-
tion or violates the "One Voice" doctrine. 2 " The dissent concluded that
California's unitary tax brought about both of these unconstitutional
results. 212
1. Risk of Multiple Taxation
Justice Powell first stated that California's allocation method not
only differs from the methods used by all of the other countries in
which Container operates, but also has no necessary relationship to
the amount of income earned in any given jurisdiction.213 As such, the
generally applied three-factor formula inevitably allocates more in-
come to a jurisdiction in which wage rates, property values and sales
prices exceed those of other jurisdictions in which a corporation op-
erates. 214 Because California is a jurisdiction in which wage rates, prop-
erty values and sales prices are higher than the other jurisdictions in
which Container operates, application of the formulary apportion-
ment method to Container's worldwide income necessarily led to mul-
tiple taxation of Container's foreign income. 215 Justice Powell thus
concluded that California's application of the unitary tax to Container
inevitably leads to multiple taxation. 2 ' 6
Justice Powell conceded that multiple taxation also might occur
with use of the separate accounting method because different jurisdic-
tions might apply different accounting principles to transactions. 217 He
argued, however, that unlike the multiple taxation caused by the uni-
tary tax, such multiple taxation would not be inherent in the separate
accounting method, because multiple taxation would arise by differing
applications of the method and not as a result of the method itself. 21 s
Justice Powell further stated that the multiple taxation problems cre-
ated by differing applications of the separate accounting method could
210 Id, at 198 (Powell, J., dissenting).
2 I I Id.
 (Powell, J., dissenting).
212 Id. at 205 (Powell, J., dissenting).
213 M. at 199 (Powell, J., dissenting).
214 Container, 465 U.S. at 199 (Powell, J., dissenting).
215 Id. (Powell, J., dissenting).
2111 1d. (Powell, J., dissenting).
217 14. at 200 (Powell, J., dissenting).
218 Id. at 200-01 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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be resolved by international agreement on how to apply the method,
and as such, could probably be avoided. 219 Thus, Justice Powell deter-
mined that the separate accounting method was a reasonable alterna-
tive to formulary apportionment. 22°
Justice Powell also rejected the majority's conclusion that the
unitary tax is valid because an increase in the California tax rates could
achieve the same tax burden as the unitary tax method. 22 ' He conceded
that theoretically, higher tax rates could achieve the same effect. 222 He
argued, however, that if California raised the corporate tax rate, the
political process required of such a change would at least provide
Container and other corporations the opportunity to voice their ob-
jections. 22s
2. Impairment of Federal Uniformity
Justice Powell also found that California's unitary tax implicated
foreign policy issues that must be left to the federal government. 224
Justice Powell first restated that California's unitary tax inevitably leads
to multiple taxation and that the Japan Line Court declared interna-
tional multiple taxation a sensitive and important matter, even where
the amounts involved are de minimis.225 Justice Powell also rejected the
majority's reliance on the fact that Container is a domestic corporation
in applying its constitutional analysis to the tax. 226 First, he pointed out
that regardless of the fact that a domestic corporation is technically
the taxpayer, California still taxes a portion of the income of Con-
tainer's foreign subsidiaries.227 Because a heavier tax burden is calcu-
lated on the basis of income in those foreign countries, it is not
unreasonable to expect that the governments of those countries will
find fault with the tax, leading to retaliation or discouragement of
American investment in those countries. 228
219 Container, 463 U.S. at 201 (Powell, j., dissenting).
22" See id. (Powell, J., dissenting).
221 Id. at 203 (Powell, j., dissenting).
222 id. (Powell, j., dissenting).
223 Id. at 203-04 (Powell, j., dissenting).
2'24 Coniainer, 463 U.S. at 202 (Powell, j., dissenting).
229 Id. (Powell, j., dissenting).
229 /d. at 202-03 (Powell, J., dissenting). The Majority specifically noted that it reserved
judgment on the application of its reasoning to a foreign or foreign parent corporation. Id. at
189, n.26.
227 Id. at 202 (Powell, J., dissenting).
22l Id. at 202-03 (Powell, j., dissenting).
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Justice Powell also noted the inapplicability of the majority's rea-
soning to an American subsidiary of a foreign corporation, because in
such a case foreign disputes and retaliation would inevitably occur, and
the resulting tax would be found unconstitutional. 22° Continuing the
analysis to its logical conclusion, justice Powell further recognized that
it would be unacceptable to invalidate the tax only as applied to foreign
multinational corporations and not as applied to domestic multina-
tional corporations, because such a result would permit California to
discriminate against a domestic corporation in favor of a foreign cor-
poration. 2st'
Justice Powell also attacked the majority's reliance on the failure
of the Executive Branch to file an amicus curiae brief in opposition to
the tax as evidence that the tax does not implicate foreign policy."' He
noted that the majority dismissed the Solicitor General's memorandum
filed as amicus curiae in Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. v. Caterpillar Tractor
Co. despite the fact that the case was directly on point and pending
before the Court."' This memorandum clearly stated the executive
branch's position that the worldwide combined reporting method im-
pairs federal uniformity in an area in which federal uniformity was
essential. 2s" Although the Solicitor General did not file such a memo-
randum in conjunction with Container, Justice Powell noted that be-
cause Chicago Bridge & Iron was still pending before the Court, and
the Solicitor General had not withdrawn his memorandum, it would
be reasonable to conclude that the memorandum accurately stated the
executive branch's position on the constitutionality of worldwide com-
bined reporting.'" In sum, Justice Powell concluded that the California
unitary tax, as applied to Container, violated the Foreign Commerce
Clause of the Constitution because it was inconsistent with federal
policy and impaired the federal government's ability to speak with one
voice regarding foreign affairs. 235
229 Container, 463 U.S. at 202-03 (Powell, J., dissenting).
230 Id. at 203 (Powell, J., dissenting).
231 1d. at 204 (Powell, J., dissenting).
232 Id. (Powell, J., dissenting).
233 Id. (Powell, J., dissenting).
254 Container, 463 U.S. at 204 (Powell, J„ dissenting).
255 1d. at 205 (Powell, J„ dissenting).
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V. RECENT INTERPRETATION OF THE "ONE VOICE" DOCTRINE:
WARDAIR CANADA, INC. V. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE
A. Factual Background
In 1986, in Wardair Canada, Inc. v. Florida Department of Revenue,
the United States Supreme Court held that a Florida tax imposed on
all purchases of airline fuel, regardless of whether the fuel was used
within or without the state, did not violate the dormant Commerce
Clause.236 Wardair Canada ("Wardair"), a Canadian airline, operated
charter flights to and from the United States. 237 Prior to 1983, Florida
prorated its airline fuel tax on a mileage basis, so that a carrier paid a
tax equal to the proportion of its Florida mileage to its worldwide mile-
age for the year. 2" On April 1, 1983, the Florida legislature amended
the law to replace the proration formula with a flat tax on all purchases
of airline fuel within the state, regardless of whether the fuel was to be
consumed within the state or whether the carrier operated substantial
business within the state. 239
Shortly after the new law became effective, Wardair filed suit in
state court attacking the constitutionality of the tax.24° Wardair argued
that the law violated the Foreign Commerce Clause because it author-
ized the collection of a tax on fuel used by foreign airlines exclusively
in foreign commerce, and because it was inconsistent with a U.S.-Ca-
nadian agreement reflecting a federal policy to exempt foreign airlines
from fuel taxes. 241 The trial court found that the federal policy to
exempt foreign airlines from fuel taxes expressed in the U.S.-Canadian
agreement precluded the individual states from acting in that area in
a way that would impair the nation's ability to speak with "one voice"
regarding foreign commerce.242 The court thus granted Wardair a
permanent injunction against the Florida Department of Revenue
from assessing and collecting the fuel tax.243
236 477 U.S. 1,3 (1986).
237 1d.
2" Id.
239 Id. at 3-4.
24') Id. at 4,
241 Wardair, 477 U.S. at 4. Wardair argued that the tax was inconsistent with the Non-Sched-
uled Air Services Agreement, May 8,1974, U.S.-Can., art. XII, 25 U.S.T. 787, 794.
242 Wardair, 477 U.S. at 4-5. For a discussion of the One Voice" doctrine, see supra notes
125-33 and accompanying text- Wardair did not argue that the law was unconstitutional under
the general Commerce Clause Complete Auto test, and conceded that the tax met the four
requirements of that. test. See Wardair, 477 U.S. at 8-9.
293 Wardair, 477 U.S. at 5.
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The Supreme Court of Florida reversed the decision of the trial
court, concluding that the Florida tax neither violated the Commerce
Clause nor violated the federal uniformity requirements of the Foreign
Commerce Clause. 244 In reaching this conclusion, the Florida Supreme
Court first noted that the U.S.-Canadian agreement exempted carri-
ers only from national, and not state or local, taxes and other charges,
and thus did not preempt state sales taxes. 245 The court additionally
reasoned that because the U.S.-Canadian agreement applied only to
national charges, the federal government had adopted no policy of
exempting foreign airlines from all fuel taxes, and thus, the tax did
not violate the "One Voice" requirement of the Foreign Commerce
Clause. 2"
B. Supreme Court Opinion
The United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction and
affirmed the decision of the Supreme Court of Florida. 247 The Court
first found that the Federal Aviation Act (the "Act") did not preempt
the tax and, additionally, that the tax did not violate the "One Voice"
requirement of the Foreign Commerce Clause. 248 In determining that
the Act did not preempt the sales tax, the Court reasoned that al-
though the Act regulated aviation extensively, it expressly permitted
states to impose taxes on airline fue1. 244 As such, the Court found
unreasonable and erroneous Wardair's argument that Congress en-
acted the Act with the intention of preempting all state regulation of
international aviation. 25"
The Court found it plausible that in drafting the Act, Congress
never considered whether states should be allowed to impose such
taxes on foreign carriers, and thus the Court considered whether a
dormant Foreign Commerce Clause analysis would render the Florida
24-4 Id.
245 Id. The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution confirms that. when Congress
acts within the scope of its constitutionally granted powers, such legislation rnay preempt state
law. U.S. CONST, art. V1, cl. 2.
246 Wardair, 477 U.S. at 5.
247 Id.
248 Id. at 6 , 9,
249 Id. at 6. See § 1113 of the Act, as added, 87 Slat. 90, and as amended, 49 U.S.C. App.
§ 1513 (1988 & Supp. V 1993), which addresses the issue of "State taxation of air commerce."
Section 1113(a) lists the kinds of taxes that are prohibited, and § 1113(b) lists those that are
permitted, among which are "sales or use taxes on the sale of goods or services." Noting this
section of the Act, the Court stated, "[lin other words, rather than prohibit state regulation in
the area, Congress invited it." Wardair, 477 U.S. at 7.
250 Wardair, 477 U.S, at 5-6.
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tax constitutionally invalid. 25 ' The Court, however, rejected Wardair's
argument that the sales tax violated the "One Voice" doctrine of the
Foreign Commerce Clause in the absence of a federal policy of recip-
rocal exemptions for instrumentalities of international air traffic. 252
Rather, the Court reasoned that the exclusion of state taxes from the
U.S.-Canadian agreement acted as an affirmative action on the part
of Congress to exclude the states from the restrictions of the agree-
ment, thus removing any need for a dormant Foreign Commerce
Clause analysis. 2" The Court also rejected Wardair's argument that
other international conventions and resolutions dealing with interna-
tional aviation precluded the Florida tax. 254 The Court concluded that
although these agreements showed an international aspiration toward
eliminating impediments to foreign air travel, the current law (as
evidenced by the Act) acquiesced to state taxation of fuel purchases. 255
In sum, the Court concluded that the omission of the states from
the U.S.-Canadian agreement did not constitute silence, but rather
constituted affirmative action by the federal government to permit
state taxation of fuel purchased by international airlines. 256 As such,
the Court recognized the agreement as evidencing a federal govern-
ment decision not to speak with one voice, thus rendering a For-
eign Commerce Clause federal uniformity analysis unnecessary. 257 The
Court therefore rejected Wardair's contentions that the Act preempted
the tax and that the tax violated the Foreign Commerce Clause and
upheld the constitutionality of the Florida sales tax on aviation fuel
purchases. 258
251 Id. at 7.
252 Id. at 9.
253 Id.
254 1d. at 10. Specifically, Wardair pointed to the Chicago Convention on International Civil
Aviation, 61 Stat. 1180, and a Resolution adopted November 14, 1966, by the International Civil
Aviation Organization (an organization of which the United States is a member due to its status
as a party to the Chicago Convention). See Wardair, 477 U.S. at 9-10. In rejecting these documents
as evidence of a clear federal policy, the Court noted that the Chicago Convention did not
prohibit taxation of local fuel purchases, and that the Resolution was never endorsed or signed
by the executive or legislative branches of the Federal Government. See id. at 10-11. The Court
further noted that the United States has entered into more than 70 bilateral aviation agreements,
none of which restricted the states' power to tax local fuel purchases. Id. at 11.
255 Wardair, 477 U.S. at i O.
256 Id. at 9.
257 /d. at 12-13.
258 Id.
December 1995]	 TAXING MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS
	 211
C. Concurring Opinion
Chief Justice Burger filed an opinion concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment of the decision. 259 The Chief Justice con-
cluded that the Federal Aviation Act clearly approved of state taxation
of aviation fuel, and thus found the majority's discussion of the appli-
cability of the Foreign Commerce Clause unnecessary. 2"" As such, Chief
Justice Burger agreed with the majority decision, but rejected the
Foreign Commerce Clause discussion as unwarranted. 2"'
D. Dissenting Opinion
Justice Blackmun filed a dissenting opinion to the decision in
Wardair. 2"2
 Justice Blackmun concluded that the "One Voice" doctrine
precluded the application of Florida's tax.263
 Justice Blackmun noted
that foreign commerce is recognized as an area in which federal uni-
formity is necessary and reasoned that the dormant Foreign Com-
merce Clause "One Voice" analysis applies unless the federal gov-
ernment has unmistakably permitted the state activity. 2"4
 Justice
Blackmun disagreed with the majority's reliance on negative implica-
tion arising out of agreements as constituting the type of clear affirma-
tive approval by the federal government which would remove the tax
from a Foreign Commerce Clause analysis.26' Because Justice Blackmun
concluded that the Foreign Commerce Clause analysis applied to the
Florida aviation fuel tax, and because he found that the tax would
impair the nation's ability to speak with one voice regarding air travel,
he would hold that the Florida tax violated the Foreign Commerce
Clause. 266
259 Id. (Burger, CJ., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
211(' Wardair, 477 U.S. at 13 (Burger ., CJ., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
26J Id. at 13-14, 17 (Burger, CJ., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
262
 Id. at 18 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
263 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
264 Id. at 18-19 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
265 Wardair, 477 U.S. at 19 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
266 Id. at 19-20 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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VI. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE UNITARY TAX
AS APPLIED TO A FOREIGN CORPORATION:
BARCLAYS BANK PLC v. FRANCHISE TAX BOARD
A. Factual Background and Procedural History
In 1994, in Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Board, the United
States Supreme Court held the worldwide combined reporting method
of taxation ("WWCR") to be constitutional as applied to a foreign-par-
ent multinational corporation. 267 The case involved the taxpayer cor-
porations Barclays Bank International Limited ("BBI") and its wholly
owned subsidiary, Barclays Bank of California ("Barcal"), both mem-
bers of the Barclays Group, a multinational enterprise (hereinafter
collectively referred to as "Barclays" ). 268
 The Barclays Group was based
in the United Kingdom and consisted of more than 220 corporations
that operated in approximately sixty nations.269 Both Barcal and BBI 27°
conducted business in California and were thus subject to California's
franchise tax. 2"
In determining its franchise tax for 1977, Barcal reported only the
income from its own operations. 272
 BBI applied the unitary business
concept in reporting its income, but included only the income of itself
and its subsidiaries, excluding its parent and its parent's other subsidi-
aries from the scope of its unitary business. 273 Upon auditing both
Barcal's and BBI's franchise tax returns for 1977, the Franchise Tax
Board (the "Board"), concluded that both entities were part of the
worldwide unitary business of the Barclays Group, and assessed addi-
tional tax liabilities of $1678 for BBI and $152,420 for Barcal. 274 Both
Barcal and BBI paid the additional assessments under protest and stied
in the California Superior Court for refunds. 275
267 114 S. Ct. 2268, 2286 (1994). Barclays was consolidated at the Supreme Court level with
Colgate-Palmolive Ca. a Franchise nix Board of California, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 761 (1992), for the
purpose of determining the constitutionality of WWCR. Because Colgate-Palmolive presented a
similar fact pattern to Container, and the Court's decision in Colgate thus merely affirmed its
holding in Container, this Note will not discuss the Colgate decision:
268 Id. at 2274.
269 Id.
27° Id. BBI is a United Kingdom corporation which does business in more than 33 nations.
Id.
271
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The Superior Court of Sacramento County found that the state's
use of WWCR violated the Foreign Commerce Clause by impairing
federal uniformity in an area where federal uniformity was essential, a
finding that the California Court of Appeal for the Third District
affirmed. 2" Upon review, the Supreme Court of California reversed the
findings of the lower courts, determining that the Japan Line dormant
Foreign Commerce Clause analysis was unnecessary because Congress
had effectively decided against prohibiting the states from applying the
WWCR unitary tax method to foreign corporations. 277 The Supreme
Court of California also determined that the lower courts did not
address the nondiscrimination requirements of both the Commerce
Clause and the Due Process Clause and thus remanded the case to the
Court of Appeal to determine whether the administrative burden for
a foreign-based unitary corporate group to comply with WWCR vio-
lated the nondiscrimination components of the Commerce or Due
Process Clauses.'" On remand, the Court of Appeal for the Third
District held that WWCR did not violate either the nondiscrimination
component of the Commerce Clause analysis or Due Process require-
ments. 279 The Supreme Court of California denied Barclays's petition
for review of the Court of Appeal's decision, and Barclays petitioned
for writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. 28°
B. Supreme Court Opinion
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed
the decision of the California Court of Appeal, holding that WWCR
violated neither the Due Process nor the Commerce Clause. 28 ' In
reaching this decision, the Court first decided that WWCR passed
constitutional muster under the requirements set forth in Complete
Auto.282 The Court further concluded that complying with WWCR did
not create an inordinate burden for foreign corporations that would
violate the Due Process Clause. 2" Lastly, the Court determined that
California's use of WWCR did not create intolerable multiple taxation
of foreign multinational corporations and did not prevent the federal
government from speaking with one voice in international trade. 284
276
 Barclays, 275 Cal. Rptr. 626, 640, 645-46 (Ct. App. 1990).
277 Barclays, 829 P.2d 279, 300 (Cal. 1992).
278 1d.
279
 Barclays, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 537, 552 (Q. App. 1992).
288
 Barclays, 114 S. Ct. at 2274.
281 Id. at 2274, 2279, 2286.
282 /d. at 2276-78; see also Complete Auto Transit Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
293 Barclays, 114 S. Ct. at 2278-79.
284 See id. at 2286.
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1. The Complete Auto Analysis
The Court held that California's application of WWCR easily met
three of the four Complete Auto criteria.285 It ruled that the nexus
requirement had been met because both Barcal and BBI conducted
business in California during the three years in which the additional
taxes were assessed. 286 The Court further decided that the tax also met
the requirement of fair apportionment because Barclays failed to dem-
onstrate that the resulting income attributed to California was com-
pletely out of proportion to the actual amount of business conducted
by Barclays within the state."' The Court additionally determined that
California's tax clearly met the requirement of being fairly related to
the services the state provided to Barclays. 288
The Court further held that California's use of WWCR did not
violate the antidiscrimination component of the Complete Auto test, but
that holding required a more probing analysis than did the other
components.289 Specifically, the Court considered Barclays's argument
that the prohibitive expense created by the need for foreign taxpayers
to convert financial and accounting records into the language, cur-
rency and accounting principles of the United States, an administrative
burden not imposed on domestic taxpayers who already maintained
records in compliance with American standards, resulted in discrimi-
nation against foreign corporations.29° The Court conceded that com-
pliance burdens disproportionately imposed on out-of jurisdiction en-
terprises may violate the Commerce Clause, but concluded that such
discrimination did not exist in this case."' Specifically, the Court de-
termined that California's regulations provided relief from such a
burden by allowing taxpayers to use reasonable approximations where
the necessary financial information could not be developed from the
financial records maintained in the regular course of business.292 The
Court noted that Barclays had indeed used these provisions in deter-
mining its 1977 worldwide income, and thus avoided the excessive
compliance costs that formed the basis of its complaint. 2" Because
295 Id. at 2276. See supra notes 87-96 and accompanying text for discussion of the Complete
Auto criteria.
2" Barclays, 114 S. Ct. at 2276.
2" Id. at 2276-77.
2"x id. at 2277.
299 1d. at 2277-78.
29(1 Id. at 2277.
291 Barclays, 114 S. Ct. at 2277-78.
:292
213 Id. at 2278.
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Barclays also failed to show that the use of approximations would
systematically overtax its income or the income of other foreign cor-
porations, the Court concluded that the tax did not unconstitutionally
discriminate against foreign cornmerce. 294
2. Due Process Analysis
The Court also rejected Barclays's argument that California's pro-
visions for the use of reasonable approximations in determining in-
come violate procedural Due Process by failing to enunciate a clear
standard of what constitute acceptable approximations. 295 The Court
concluded that the failure to articulate a bright-line standard for ac-
ceptance did not result in a grant of standardless discretion to the
Board because the standard of reasonableness constrained the Board
in making its determinations. 296 The Court further noted that reason-
ableness is a common standard under federal income tax laws. 297 In
sum, the Court determined that the standard of reasonableness, as well
as the power of the judiciary to curtail the discretion of the Board,
were sufficient to limit the discretion of California tax officials and
bring the provisions within the parameters of Due Process.'"
3. Foreign Commerce Clause Scrutiny
a. Risk of Multiple 'Taxation
In discussing the additional considerations of the tax required by
the Foreign Commerce Clause, the Court first concluded that the risk
of multiple international taxation did not prohibit California's use of
WWCR. 299 The Court accepted Barclays's assertion that the use of
WWCR carries an aggravated risk of multiple taxation when applied to
a foreign corporation with extensive operations outside of the United
States, because in such a case, a higher proportion of foreign income
will be subject to tax." The Court, however, rejected this evidence as
291 Id.
295 Id. at 2278-79.
296 See Barclays, 114 S. Ct. at 2278.
297 Id, Specifically, the Court noted 26 U.S.C. § 162 (1988 & Supp. V 1993), which allows
deductions for ordinary business expenses, including reasonable allowance for compensation,
and 26 U.S.C. § 167 (1988 & Supp. V 1993), which allows depreciation deductions for reasonable
wear and tear as evidence that "reasonableness" is an acceptable standard under federal income
tax laws. Barclays, 114 S. Ct. at 2278.
298
 Barclays, 114 S. Ct. at 2278-79.
2" Id, at 2279,2281.
99n /d. at 2279-80. This increased multiple taxation will arise because CalifOrnia will usually
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a basis for prohibiting the use of WWCR. 30 ' Rather, the Court restated
the Container holding that multiple taxation does not invalidate a tax
where: (1) multiple taxation is not the inevitable result of WWCR; and
(2) no alternative method of taxation will eliminate the risk of multiple
taxation."2 The Court further reasoned that neither of those consid-
erations would be dispositively diminished when WWCR is applied to
foreign, as opposed to domestic, multinational corporations. 303 The
Court concluded that when WWCR is applied to a foreign corporation,
multiple taxation is still not inevitable, but rather depends on the
individual facts of the case." 4 Additionally, the Court reasoned that
because separate accounting would not alleviate the risk of multiple
taxation in the context of a domestic corporation, it probably would
not do so with respect to a foreign corporation." 5
The Court also rejected the dissent's argument that multiple taxa-
tion is more problematic as applied to a foreign corporation because
foreign taxpayers do not have access to the political process in the
United States and thus cannot effectively voice their objections to what
they perceive to be an unfair tax."fi To the contrary, the Court con-
cluded that foreign governments have effectively responded to Cali-
fornia's use of WWCR through diplomatic notes, amicus briefs and
retaliatory legislation. 307 The Court further supported its conclusion by
noting that adverse foreign response was an impetus for California's
decision to revise WWCR to include a water's-edge provision. 308
b. Impairment of Federal Uniformity: The "One Voice" Doctrine
The Court also held that California's use of WWCR did not im-
pede federal uniformity in an area in which uniformity is essential."'
The Court first restated its findings in Container that: (1) no legislative
history demonstrated a congressional intent to preempt the California
tax; (2) the United States Tax Treaty restrictions did not bind the
have higher property values, wage rates, and sales prices than other jurisdictions in which a
multinational corporation operates. See supra notes 213-16 and accompanying text for discussion
of same.
901 Barclays, 114 S. Ct. at 2280-81.




306 Barclays, 114 S. Ct. at 2281.
;4)7 Id.
30" Id. at 2273, 2281.
3()9 See id. at 2281, 2284, 2286.
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states; and (3) Congress had long considered, but not enacted, legis-
lation designed to regulate state taxation of income as evidence that
WWCR does not violate the "One Voice" doctrine.si° The Court pointed
to its reasoning in Wardair as additional support for its conclusion that
WWCR did not violate the Foreign Commerce Clause.'" In Wardair,
the Court had determined that resolutions between the United States
and foreign governments allowing for reciprocal exemption from avia-
tion fuel taxes did not constitute federal policy to which the states were
required to adhere. 312 Rather, the Court had determined that the
failure of the federal government to bind the states to these resolutions
demonstrated congressional acquiescence to state taxation of aviation
fue1. 3"
The Barclays Court concluded that the reasoning underlying both
the Container and the Wardair decisions is that Congress may passively
indicate that certain state practices do not impair required federal
uniformity." The Court further concluded that, as in Container and
Wardair, Barclays demonstrated no specific indications of congres-
sional intent to bar California's use of WWCR." In reaching its con-
clusion that Congress had passively acquiesced to California's use of
WWCR, the Court noted that during the eleven years that had passed
since the Container decision, Congress had considered, but failed to
enact, legislation that would prohibit the states' use of WWCR. 3 "'
The Court also relied upon the history of the drafting of the tax
treaty between the United Suites and the United Kingdom known as
the "Convention for Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention
of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital Gains"
as evidence that Congress has approved of the states' use of WWCR. 317
As originally drafted, the treaty contained a provision precluding the
states from using WWCR to determine the tax liability of U.K-control-
led corporations." The Senate rejected this version of the treaty and
51° Id. at 2281-82.
511 Barclays, 114 S. CL at 2282-83, See supra notes 247-58 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the Court's decision in Wardair.
512
 Barclays, 114 S. CL at 2282.
515 1d.
514 Id. at 2282-83.
315 Id. at 2283.
311 Id
317
 Barclays, 114 S. Ct. at 2284; see also Aug. 26, 1976, U.S.-U.K., art. 9, 31 U.S.T. 5768, 5677,
5709-10 [hereinafter Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation].
518 Barclays, 114 S. Ct. at 2284; see also Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation,
supra note 317, 31 U.S.T. at 5677.
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subsequently ratified the treaty only after the provision precluding the
use of WWCR was revised so as not to apply to the states." 9
The Court additionally rejected Barclays's argument that execu-
tive branch actions, statements and amicus filings opposing WWCR
constitute a clear federal directive prohibiting states' use of WWCR. 32°
In this regard, the Court restated that the United States Constitution
expressly grants Congress, and not the President, the power to "regu-
late Commerce with foreign Nations." 32 ' As such, the Court concluded
that executive branch pronouncements lack the force of law and can-
not render unconstitutional an otherwise constitutionally valid, con-
gressionally condoned taxing method. 322
C. Concurring and Dissenting Opinions
Justice Blackmun filed a concurring opinion in order to restate
his position that the Court should not rely on congressional inaction
to prohibit application of WWCR as implicit permission to use the
method.323 Justice Blackmun, however, did join the decision of the
Court."24 Despite his finding of misplaced reliance on congressional
inaction, Justice Blackmun concluded that WWCR meets the require-
ments of the United States Constitution because it does not directly
burden instrumentalities of foreign commerce and does not impair
federal uniformity in an area in which such uniformity is essentia1. 325
Justice Scalia concurred in part and concurred in the judgment
for largely the same reasons as Justice Blackmun. 326 Justice Scalia also
disagreed somewhat with the majority's opinion that no more than
congressional inaction is required to infer permission for the states to
impose restrictions on foreign commerce." 7 Alternatively, he would
find a negative Commerce Clause restriction where a state law: (1)
facially discriminates against interstate or international commerce; or
(2) is indistinguishable from a type of law previously held to be uncoil-
stitutional. 3" Justice Scalia, however, did concede that his view of the
319 Barclays, 114 S. CL at 2284; see also Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation,
supra note 317, 31 U.S.T. at 5709-10 (3d Protocol, amending art. 9).
32° Barclays, 114 S. Ct. at 2285.
321 Id.; see also U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
322 Barclays, 114 S. Ct. at 2286.
"Id. at 2286-87 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun first stated this position in
fiel Containers International Corp. v. Huddleston. See 113 S. Ct. 1095, 1110 (1993).
324 Barclays, 114 S. Ct. at 2287 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
323 Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
32° Id. at 2287 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
327 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
3" Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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negative Foreign Commerce Clause analysis and that of the majority
would likely produce similar results in application. 329
Justice O'Connor filed an opinion, in which Justice Thomas
joined, dissenting in the majority decision in Barclays and concurring
in the majority opinion in the companion case of Colgate-Palmolive Co.
v. Franchise Tax Board. 3" Justice O'Connor, who had earlier dissented
in the Container decision, stated that she did not think that the earlier
decision should be overruled, but thought that its holding should not
be extended to the Barclays situation involving a foreign-based parent
company of a multinational enterprise."' Specifically, Justice O'Con-
nor concluded that WWCR met the Complete Auto interstate commerce
requirements, but failed to meet the additional requirements, set forth
in Japan Line, for taxes affecting foreign commerce. 339ustice O'Con-
nor agreed with the majority's reasoning that, given the failure of
Congress affirmatively to prohibit the use of WWCR, the need for
federal uniformity does not prevent such use.'" Justice O'Connor,
however, concluded that the risk of multiple taxation created by Cali-
fornia's application of WWCR is sufficient to render it unconstitu-
tional.334
Justice O'Connor reasoned that double taxation is inevitable with
the application of WWCR to foreign multinational enterprises due
to its inconsistency with the taxing method used by foreign taxing
authorities.'" She noted that to the extent that California has higher
property values, wage rates and sales prices than other taxing jurisdic-
tions in which a corporation may operate, California's use of WWCR
will consistently result in multiple taxation of income. 336 She further
reasoned that although WWCR passed constitutional muster in Con-
tainer because the tax fell on a domestic international corporation, the
Container Court purposely left open the question of whether the same
329 Barclays, 119 S. Ct. at 2287 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
990 1d. (O'Connor,,]., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). justices
O'Connor and Thomas concurred in the judgment in Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. Franchise Tax Board
(consolidated with Barclays) because it presented an identical constitutional challenge to Con-
tainer Corp. v. Franchise Tax Board, and the decision thus affirmed the Court's earlier holding in
Container. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
331 /d. at 2287 (O'Connor', J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
3" Id. at 2288 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
533 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
334 Barclays, 114 S. Ct. at '1290 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
335 Id. at 2288 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
336 Id. (O'Connor, j., concurring in the judgment in part. and dissenting in part). justice
O'Connor further noted that California will usually be such a jurisdiction. Id, (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
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tax would be constitutional as applied to a foreign parent corpora-
tion. 337 She determined that this question must be answered in the
negative. 338
Justice O'Connor thus concluded that a state method of taxation
that results in multiple taxation of foreign corporations due to its
nonconformity with international practice is unconstitutional, even
though the same tax would be constitutional as applied to a domestic
multinational corporation. 8" In this regard, she noted that, although
domestic taxpayers have access to the political process at both state and
national levels and can seek redress through the normal channels, such
access is not available to foreign taxpayers.84° She further emphasized
that most of the United States' trading partners have objected to
California's use of WWCR and that deterrence of foreign investment
in the United States would adversely affect the nation as a whole. 34 '
Justice O'Connor thus concluded that the multiple taxation of foreign
enterprises and the likely adverse consequences faced by the United
States as a result of California's application of WWCR are sufficient
evidence to render the California tax unconstitutional. 342
VII. PROBLEMS WITH THE BARCLAYS CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
Several problems exist with the constitutional analysis of WWCR
contained in the Court's decision in Barclays. The Court, while pre-
tending to adhere to Japan Line, diluted the requirements set forth in
that opinion so as to render them useless as constitutional safeguards.
In doing so, the Court improperly extended the questionable Container
constitutional analysis of WWCR, even though the Container Court
formulated that analysis based on the fact that Container was a domes-
tic corporation, and the decision specifically reserved determination
of whether the same guidelines would be applicable to a foreign or
foreign parent corporation. 343
The Container analysis of the Foreign Commerce Clause implica-
tions of WWCR was based on faulty reasoning. Additionally, even if the
Container guidelines are valid, they do not apply to the case of a
337 1d. at 2289 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part); see
also Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 189 n.26 (1983).
35° Barclays, 119 S. Ct. at 2289 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
32° Id. (O'Connor, j., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
340 Id. (O'Connor, J. concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
341 Id. at 2290 (O'Connor, j., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
342 Id. (O'Connor, j., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
343 See Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 189 n.26 (1983).
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foreign-parent corporation. 344 As such, the Barclays Court did not re-
view the validity of WWCR under the Foreign Commerce Clause with
the requisite degree of scrutiny. First, the Court did not properly
address the problem of multiple taxation caused by WWCR and even
dismissed as irrelevant the fact that actual multiple taxation will exist
when WWCR is applied to a multinational corporation. 345 Additionally,
the Court applied a theoretical Foreign Commerce Clause "One Voice"
analysis that ignored reality in its determination that WWCR does not
implicate foreign policy issues.346
A. Multiple Taxation Issues
In Japan Line, the Court pointed out that even "a slight overlap-
ping of tax—a problem that might be deemed de minimis in a domes-
tic context—assumes importance when sensitive matters of foreign
relations and national sovereignty are concerned."347 In finding the tax
in question unconstitutional, the Court emphasized that the California
tax produced not only the risk of multiple taxation, but also multiple
taxation in fact."'
In Container-, the Court relaxed the Japan Line test somewhat,
stating that multiple international taxation will not invalidate a state
tax where: (1) multiple taxation is not inevitable; and (2) no reason-
able alternative exists that will prevent multiple taxation. 349 The Court
concluded that multiple taxation was not the inevitable result of the
use of WWCR, because no single jurisdiction had the right to tax the
property in full, and thus an overlap in taxes, as opposed to actual
double imposition of taxes, caused any multiple taxation.n° The Court
additionally concluded that separate accounting was not a reasonable
alternative to WWCR because its use could still result in multiple
taxation if jurisdictions applied differing accounting principles. 35 ' In
deciding to relax the Japan Line analysis, the Container Court distin-
guished Japan Line from Container because the taxpayer in Japan Line
was a foreign corporation and the taxpayer in Container was a domestic
corporation.352 As the Container Court formulated the revised version
344 See id.
345 Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal., 114 S. Ct. 2268, 2280 (1994).
346 Id. at 2281-86.
347Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of L.A., 441 U.S. 434,456 (1979).
343 Id. at 452.
549 Container Corp. of Am, v, Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159,192-93 (1983).
35° Id. at 188.
3 '5i Id. at 191.
351 Id. at 188-89.
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of the Japan Line test, it emphasized that Container was distinguishable
from Japan Line because the legal incidence of the tax in Container fell
on a domestic-owned, as opposed to foreign-owned, multinational en-
terprise. 3"
The Court's conclusion in Container that multiple taxation is not
the inevitable result of California's use of WWCR was based on theo-
retical assumptions and not economic realities. The majority in Con.-
tainerconcluded that unlike the inevitable double taxation which arose
in Japan Line because California taxed property that Japan had the
right to tax in full, the multiple taxation resulting from California's use
of WWCR in Container was not inevitable because it resulted from
overlapping methods of allocation rather than a second layer of taxa-
tion.m4 Although theoretically this may be true, the dissent in Container
well illustrated the economically correct result of the tax—because
California is a state where property values, wage rates and sales prices
are consistently higher than the other jurisdictions in which most
international corporations operate, the three-factor formula will inevi-
tably result in taxation of profits actually earned in the foreign opera-
tions.555 Because the rest of the international community uses the
separate accounting method, those foreign jurisdictions already will
have imposed a tax on the profits earned within their borders, there
will be a layering of taxes, and the end result will be the same as the
"inevitable" multiple taxation found in Japan Line. 356
In the Container dissent, Justice Powell also pointed out that al-
though multiple taxation may occur with separate accounting, such
multiple taxation is not inherent in the tax method itself.357 He further
reasoned that, because the international community accepts the sepa-
rate accounting method, it is likely that any multiple taxation prob-
lems caused by inconsistent application of the method could by re-
solved by international agreement on how to apply the method.358
Conversely, WWCR creates multiple taxation because it fundamentally
differs from tax methods applied by foreign countries and is not
accepted by United States foreign trading partners, thus it is less likely
that an amicable resolution to the multiple taxation problem created
by WWCR could be reached through international negotiation."
5" Id.
554 Container, 463 U.S. at 188.
355 1d. at 199-200 (Powell. J., dissenting).
356 Id. (Powell, j., dissenting).
557 Id. at 200-01 (Powell, j., dissenting).
5" Id. at 201 (Powell, j., dissenting).
359 Container, 463 U.S. at 201 (Powell, J., dissenting). In fact, the majority of U.S. trading
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Additionally, in Barclays, the taxpayer corporation was foreign-
owned, and thus, even if the Court's analysis in Container was sound,
the Barclays Court should have applied the stricter guidelines set forth
in Japan Line. Therefore, because Barclays produced evidence of both
actual multiple taxation of its foreign income and an aggravated risk
of double taxation for foreign multinational corporations, the tax was
unconstitutionally applied and the analysis should have gone no fur-
ther. Keeping in mind the language in Japan Line concerning the
impermissibility of even a slight overlap in taxation in the international
context, WWCR clearly fails to meet constitutional requirements when
applied to foreign multinational corporations. 3 °
In finding WWCR constitutional, the Barclays Court did not attach
the requisite importance to the fact that multiple taxation has long
been regarded as offensive to the Commerce Clause. 35 ' The Japan Line
Court recognized that multiple taxation was especially problematic in
the international context because of the lack of an authoritative tribu-
nal capable of ensuring that the aggregate of taxes placed on interna-
tional income or property does not exceed one full value.362 In both
Container and Barclays, the Court dismissed actual multiple taxation as
irrelevant to the determination of the constitutionality of a tax without
providing any sound reason for ignoring the precedents that state
otherwise.s63
B. "One Voice" Doctrine
In Japan Line, the Court stated that a tax would be unconstitu-
tional as violating the "One Voice" doctrine of the Foreign Commerce
Clause if it prevented federal uniformity in an area in which uniformity
was required. 364 That same Court noted that international commerce
partners have openly contested the use of WWCR and have sought to have it declared unconsti-
tutional. See. Barclays, 114 S. Ct. at 2268,2289-90 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in
part and dissenting in part), As such, it is unlikely that members of the international trading
community would negotiate with Callibrnia to alleviate multiple taxation problems associated
with the use of WWCR. Id.
36° ,50'441 U.S 434,456 (1979) (even a slight overlap in international tax is impermissible).
361 Id.; see, e.g., Evco v. Jones, 409 U.S. 91,93-94 (1972); Central R.R. of Pa. v. Pennsylvania,
370 U.S. 607,612 (1962); Standard Oil Co. v. Peck, 342 U.S. 382, 384-85 (1952) J.D. Adams mfg .
Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307,311 (1938).
362 441 U.S. at 447-48. Conversely, the United States Supreme Court has required apportion-
ment of taxes among the taxing states in order to prevent multiple taxation of interstate com-
merce. Id. at 446-47.
a See supra notes 177-86 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Container Court's
reasoning on this issue, and notes 299-308 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Barclays
Court's analysis of same.
364 441 U.S. at 450-51.
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was such an area."' In Container, the Court reaffirmed the Japan Line
reasoning and elaborated on the test by stating that a state tax would
violate the "One Voice" standard if it either implicated foreign policy
issues that must be left to the federal government or violated a clear
federal directive."' The Container Court recognized that the most ob-
vious impermissible foreign policy implication of a state tax is that it
might offend American trading partners and lead to retaliation against
the nation as a whole. 367 The Container Court then set forth objective
standards for determining the likelihood of international offense and
retaliation and concluded that the risk of retaliation created by the tax
in question was slight, because: (1) the tax fell on a domestic corpora-
tion; (2) the tax did not create an automatic asymmetry in interna-
tional taxation; and (3) California could have achieved the same tax
result with use of the separate accounting method by raising its tax
rates."88
The factors that led the Court in Container to uphold the unitary
tax are either questionable in their logic or do not apply in the case
of application of WWCR to Barclays. For example, in finding WWCR
constitutional, the Container Court emphasized that the legal incidence
of the tax fell upon a domestic entity."' The Court distinguished
Container from Japan Line because the tax in Container was imposed
upon a domestic corporation, and the tax in Japan Line was imposed
upon a foreign entity.'" The Container Court noted that this factor
would be absent even in the case of a domestic corporation owned by
foreign interests, and specifically refrained from addressing the consti-
tutionality of WWCR as applied to a foreign corporation."71 As a foreign
enterprise with certain operations entirely outside the United States,
Barclays clearly fell within the reservation maintained by the Container
Court, and thus the Barclays Court should not have applied the same
analysis.
Further, as the dissent in Container emphasized, automatic asym-
metry is present when the unitary tax is applied to a multinational
corporation."' The United States and all of its trading partners have
adopted the arm's length method of allocating income for taxation.'"
363 See id. at 452-53.
56(' 463 U.S. 159, 194 (1983).
367
 Id.
3138 Id. at 194-95.
569 /d. at 195.
37" Id, at 188.
371 463 U.S at 189 n.26, 195 n.52.
372 See id. at 202 (Powell, J., dissenting).
973 Id. at 187..
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Because the arm's length method and WWCR are based on differing
economic assumptions, there exists no effective means of reconciling
the differences in the application of these methods.' 74 Conversely,
overlapping taxation caused by differing applications of the arm's
length method is not inherent in the method itself, and any resulting
discrepancies are easier to resolve through international negotiation!'"
Although theoretically the use of WWCR may not result in multiple
taxation of foreign income in every single case, that allocation method
is inconsistent enough from accepted international practice that mul-
tiple taxation is inevitable in the majority of cases.'" Further, as Justice
Powell noted in his dissent in Container, because California's property
values, wage rates and sales prices are usually higher than the other
jurisdictions in which international enterprises operate, multiple taxa-
tion inevitably results from the asymmetry created by California's ap-
plication of WWCR. 377
In finding California's use of WWCR constitutional, the Container
Court also emphasized that California could achieve the same tax
result through use of the arm's length method by raising its tax rates.'"
The reasoning of the Court here is questionable in its logic. The fact
that the same tax could be achieved by the use of a constitutional
taxing method should not validate the use of an unconstitutional
method. As Justice Powell noted in his dissent in Container, even if
California could achieve the same tax result with an increased tax rate,
an increased tax burden caused by an unfair tax differs substantially
from an increased tax burden created by a properly increased tax
rate!y7'9 First, if California were to raise its corporate tax rates, it would
have to do so through the correct political channels, which would
provide corporate taxpayers the opportunity to effectively lodge their
objections to the increase. 38° Second, WWCR is problematic in that it
is based on fundamental assumptions that conflict with the method
used by foreign nations and has thus invited retaliatory action by
offending U.S. trading partners. As such, the fact that the same tax
could be achieved by properly raising the general tax rates does not
reduce the problems associated with the application of WWCR to the
income of foreign entities.
"4 Id. at 199, 201 (Powell, J., dissenting).
375 1d. at 201 (Powell, J., dissenting).
578 See Container, 463 U.S. at 199 (Powell, J., dissenting).
377 Id. at 199-200 (Powell, J., dissenting).
' 78 1d. at 195.
579 Id. at 203-04 (Powell, J., dissenting),
3" Id. (Powell, J., dissenting).
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The Container and Barclays reasoning that the use of WWCR does
not violate the "One Voice" doctrine is especially problematic because
such reasoning does not align with the language in Container that
stated, "[T]he most obvious foreign policy implication of a state tax is
the threat it might pose of offending our foreign trading partners and
leading them to retaliate against the Nation as a whole." 38 ' As previously
discussed, WWCR is completely inconsistent with the internationally
accepted method of taxation. Most of the United States' trading part-
ners have objected to California's use of WWCR. 382 In 1985, the United
Kingdom enacted retaliatory legislation, and, dissatisfied with the in-
effective efforts to alleviate the unfairness of the WWCR provisions,
threatened to implement such legislation as recently as 1993. 383 Clearly,
the use of WWCR to tax foreign entities offends foreign trading part-
ners and creates a severe risk of both retaliation against U.S. interests
abroad and deterrence of foreign investment in the United States. 384
The Container Court avoided deciding whether the tax in question
implicated foreign policies by stating that the Court has little experi-
ence in determining when foreign trading partners will be offended
by a tax and instead adopted "objective standards" for determining
when there is likelihood of offense and retaliation. 385 The Barclays
Court could not reasonably hide behind such a shield of ignorance,
because the strong evidence of international objection to WWCR re-
moved any need for guesswork regarding the likelihood of offense and
retaliation. Even if analyzed under the objective standards in Container,
WWCR fails to meet the requirements of the "One Voice" doctrine
because the risk of offense and retaliation with its use is actual and
clear.
CONCLUSION
The constitutional problems raised by multijurisidictional taxation
are truly complex and perhaps unavoidable. Although any chosen
3131 Container, 463 U.S. at 194.
"2 Barclays, 114 S. Ct. 2268, 2289-90 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in
part and dissenting in part). The nations that have voiced their objection to the use of WWCR
include: Belgium, Australia, Austria, Canada, Finland, Japan, Norway, Sweden, the United King-
dom and Switzerland. See id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting
in part).
sss Carson, supra note 65, at 8.
Sg4 See Barclays, 114 S. Ct. at 2290 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
n Container, 463 U.S. at 199. See supra notes 193-99 and accompanying text for a deline-
ation of the objective standards set forth in Container.
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allocation method could create an unfair allocation, this fact does not
render a constitutional analysis of an allocation method unnecessary.
Both the Commerce Clause and the Due Process Clause of the United
States Constitution set forth guidelines for state taxes, and in Japan
Line, the United States Supreme Court unequivocally voiced its inter-
pretation of the exact requirements of those guidelines. 386
Truly, the expanding global economy and concomitant increase
in the complexity of taxation methods have created a need for modern
and unexpected interpretations of the relevant clauses of the Consti-
tution. As the Japan Line decision well demonstrated, however, the
words and policies contained in the Commerce and Due Process
Clauses of the Constitution are effectively adaptable to any taxation
method, regardless of its level of complexity. 387 Interestingly, both the
Container Court and the Barclays Court chose not to overrule theJapan
Line decision, but instead limited the constitutional guidelines set forth
in Japan Line so as to render them ineffective. 388 In finding the use of
WWCR to determine the tax of foreign entities constitutional, the
Barclays Court ignored the basic precepts set forth in the Constitu-
tion and delineated in Japan Line. Post-Barclays, one can only wonder
whether any constitutional restrictions on the allocation of an interna-
tional state income tax still exist.
CHRISTINA M. LYONS
586 441 U.S. 434,446-48 (1979); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, amend. XIV.
387 Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 446-48.
388
 See Barclays, 114 S. Ct. 2268; Container, 463 U.S. 159; Japan Line, 441 U.S. 434.
